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ORIGINAL: Dancre

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ORIGINAL: Lizahana

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ORIGINAL: Goodwill


So now these same democrats say that bush lied to us and there never were any wmd's and that he took us to war for nothing.

Mr Goodwill,

The point is, of course, that the people who said these things did NOT unilaterally invade Iraq without UN favor, correct me if I am wrong.

And John Kerry's speech, by the way, is taken out of context. He said that he would support the war iff (if and only if) the weapons inspectors were allowed to finish their jobs - which, obviously they were not - unless you wish to argue that Duelfur, Clark, O'Neill - all <formerly> "the presidents men" were lying? Are you argueing that? Because their reports do NOT support what you are claiming.

Peace & God bless,

Liza, i'm hoping you read the Duelfer report: report which says that Hussain wanted to rebuild his weaponery program and was paying off the UN to dissolve the restrictions, which is why they didn't agree with the invasion. why kill the cash cow? please read his report. as for Clark, well, he's basically the laughing stock of washington. i won't put much stock in anything he says.

kim

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ORIGINAL: gwingert

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if Iraq b/c a democratic nation, it will cripple the Al-Quada and they know it

You obviously don't understand how Al-Qaeda operates or appreciate the power of their ideology.

So let me ask you this...if democracy takes hold in Iraq, will the US Government force democracy in decidely undemocratic places like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait?

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ORIGINAL: Lizahana

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ORIGINAL: Dancre

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ORIGINAL: Lizahana

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ORIGINAL: Goodwill


So now these same democrats say that bush lied to us and there never were any wmd's and that he took us to war for nothing.

Mr Goodwill,

The point is, of course, that the people who said these things did NOT unilaterally invade Iraq without UN favor, correct me if I am wrong.

And John Kerry's speech, by the way, is taken out of context. He said that he would support the war iff (if and only if) the weapons inspectors were allowed to finish their jobs - which, obviously they were not - unless you wish to argue that Duelfur, Clark, O'Neill - all <formerly> "the presidents men" were lying? Are you argueing that? Because their reports do NOT support what you are claiming.

Peace & God bless,

Liza, i'm hoping you read the Duelfer report: report which says that Hussain wanted to rebuild his weaponery program and was paying off the UN to dissolve the restrictions, which is why they didn't agree with the invasion. why kill the cash cow? please read his report. as for Clark, well, he's basically the laughing stock of washington. i won't put much stock in anything he says.

kim

Hi Kim, Yes, I did read the report. I have a link to the cia website, not the findlaw one that you used: http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf

Funny, this is what I read in it:

"Since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery
capability, and by 1991 Baghdad had purchased the missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis
for nearly all of its future missile system developments. The Soviet Union was a key supplier of missile hardware
and provided 819 Scud-B missiles and ground support equipment.
Iraq’s experiences with long-range delivery systems in the Iran/Iraq war were a vital lesson to Iraqi President
Saddam Husayn. The successful Iraqi response to the Iranian long-range bombardment of Baghdad, leading
to the War of the Cities, probably saved Saddam.
By 1991, Iraq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify some of its delivery systems to increase
their range and to develop WMD dissemination options, with the Al Husayn being a fi rst step in this direction.
The next few years of learning and experiments confi rmed that the Regime’s goal was for an effective
long-range WMD delivery capability and demonstrated the resourcefulness of Iraq’s scientists and technicians.
Iraq failed in its efforts to acquire longer-range delivery systems to replace inventory exhausted in the
Iran/Iraq war. This was a forcing function that drove Iraq to develop indigenous delivery system production
capabilities.
Desert Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and inspections brought many of Iraq’s delivery system
programs to a halt. ...• The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debriefings
of Iraqi offi cials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles
after 1991.
Key Findings
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and signifi cance of the pre-1991
Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively
decayed after that date.
• Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf war. ISG found no evidence to suggest
concerted efforts to restart the program....

Key Findings
Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions
were judged favorable:
• Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a
weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the Iran-Iraq war—and contributed to deterring
the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad.
While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq
unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications
that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire
to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered...
In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain
advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW
program or was conducting BW-specifi c work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, despite
evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of
discussion or even interest in BW at the Presidential level."...
ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons
and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document
complete destruction. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF)...
ISG is aware of BW-applicable research since 1996, but ISG judges it was not conducted in connection with
a BW program.
• ISG has uncovered no evidence of illicit research conducted into BW agents by universities or
research organizations....In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent
production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons."
I'm assuming you know of the military assistance the US gave to Hussein in the 1980's, or how, when Hussein did use chemicals on his own people - the US STILL remained on friendly ties with Hussein to protect our economic interests. Just in case you forgot"
"U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup
Trade in Chemical Arms Allowed Despite Their Use on Iranians, Kurds

By Michael Dobbs
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, December 30, 2002; Page A01

High on the Bush administration's list of justifications for war against Iraq are President Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons, nuclear and biological programs, and his contacts with international terrorists. What U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these offenses date back to a period when Hussein was seen in Washington as a valued ally.
...
review of thousands of declassified government documents and interviews with former policymakers shows that U.S. intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in shoring up Iraqi defenses against the "human wave" attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague....

Chemicals Kill Kurds

In late 1987, the Iraqi air force began using chemical agents against Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq that had formed a loose alliance with Iran, according to State Department reports. The attacks, which were part of a "scorched earth" strategy to eliminate rebel-controlled villages, provoked outrage on Capitol Hill and renewed demands for sanctions against Iraq. The State Department and White House were also outraged -- but not to the point of doing anything that might seriously damage relations with Baghdad.

"The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is . . . important to our long-term political and economic objectives," Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy wrote in a September 1988 memorandum that addressed the chemical weapons question. "We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive to influence the Iraqis." ...
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A52241-2002Dec29¬Found=true

Now, I assume you think that we should invade all countries that "may start" a WMD program, or "have plans" to start a WMD program. Now, wouldn't we be invading half the countries in the world. The Bush admin said they had hard evidence of WMD - clearly the Duelfer refutes this. I may remind you that at the VERY SAME time we invaded Iraq, North Korea was sending missiles into the Pacific & outright threatening the US - A LOT more threatening to me.
And you're dissing Richard Clarke?!?! He worked under Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and yes, you guessed it, George W Bush II, the current president as national security advisor, terrorism czar. Hardly a laughing stock less you think the four aforementioned presidents chose wrongly? If so, write them a letter.
Hussein had to go - but not at the cost of a reported 25,000 innocent Iraqis (w/even higher estimates) and the loss of 1700+ of our best & brightest. We could've assassinated Hussein and his evil cohorts, and/or pressured our Arab buddies that are neighbors to Hussein to step down.

Peace & God bless,

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ORIGINAL: Goodwill

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Saddam Husayn.

well your report cant even spell Saddam Hussein right so there goes that idea

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ORIGINAL: Dancre


MMM. . . . . rather interesting that folks ignore the truth and want to believe these silly lies. well to help you all along, since you do ignore the truth, i thought i'd bring the truth to you in the form of Mr. Duelfer's report. unfortunately, copy right laws forbid me from posting all of it, so here are some key points. are we ready? here we go:

Regime Strategic Intent:
Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when
sanctions were lifted.

• Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait),
maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq’s strategic
policy.

• Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.

• The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came
to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.

• By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in
terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that
which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.

• Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire.

• The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifi able group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieu-tenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.

Regime Finance and Procurement:
Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF (March 2003), Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those objectives, Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, toportray a strong military capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab leader. Saddam recognized that the reconstitution of Iraqi WMD enhanced both his security and image. Conse-quently, Saddam needed to end UN-imposed sanctions to fulfill his goals.

One aspect of Saddam’s strategy of unhinging the UN’s sanctions against Iraq, centered on Saddam’s efforts to influence certain UN SC permanent members, such as Russia, France, and China and some nonpermanent (Syria, Ukraine) members to end UN sanctions. Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and international public opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the five permanent members and foment international public support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign and an extensive diplomatic effort.

Another element of this strategy involved circumventing UN sanctions and the OFF program by means of “Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam to generate
a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN. The successful implementation of the Protocols, continued oil smuggling efforts, and the manipulation of UN OFF contracts emboldened Saddam to pursue his military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997 and peaking in 2001. These efforts covered conventional arms, dual-use goods acquisition, and some WMD-related programs.

ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of thses systems progressed to production and only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam's continuing desire-up to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-for a long-range delivery capability. [a side note: on the show Front Line "looking for suddam's weapons", after the invasion by american forces, a reporter interviewed one of the engineers who was to design one of these missiles. He confirmed these missiles but was executed by the bath party the next day.]

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW-related efforts.

• The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program.

• Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which would have
enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented.

The above is only sections of the reportThe whole report can be found here: http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/dciwmd93004kf.pdf

Now after reading the above, i for one am glad that "dimbulb" took us to war. from the evidence presented by those working with and for Hussain, it would only have been a matter of time before Hussain would have had a working chemical weapons program. And based on other evidence in this report it is clear he would have turned his sights on the US and her allies. I think this ends this discussion, unless there are others who wish to throw out silly, meaningless, hate filled excuses that have no merit or facts behind them. unless of course, this report scares the living blank out of you, then meaningless excuses are understandable.

kim

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ORIGINAL: Goodwill

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Saddam Husayn.

well your report cant even spell Saddam Hussein right so there goes that idea

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i'm still amazed at those who will ignore the truth and run after lies.

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maybe they're scared, maybe they just refuse to listen.

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thanks again, GW.

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ORIGINAL: Jipsah

Oh yes, thanks ever so much. As a taxpayer, I'm grateful that we're throwing $16,000,000,000 a week into a bonfire.

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you guys are hopless wonders please stick to what ever God hads called you to do and leave the politicing up to the adults

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Oh yes, thanks ever so much. As a taxpayer, I'm grateful that we're throwing $16,000,000,000 a week into a bonfire.

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I know isnt it wonderful...Burn Baby Burn